When there are three parties, it is well known that the Coase Theorem may not hold even when there are no transaction costs, due to the emptiness of the core of the corresponding cooperative game [Aivazian and Callen (1981) ]. We show that the standard Coasean bargaining game involving three parties is strategically equivalent to an asymmetric three player majority game. Hence, when there are three parties, the Coase Theorem fails if and only if the core of the corresponding three player majority game is empty. We use this equivalence result to derive all instances in which the Coase Theorem will and will not hold with three parties, and show that the Coase Theorem will actually hold most (over 80 per cent) of the time. We also demonstrate, in contrast to Aivazian and Callen (2003) , that it is always possible to find a set of transaction costs which, when introduced into a frictionless bargaining situation, will cause an empty core to become non-empty. In other words, with suitably designed transaction costs, it is possible for the Coase Theorem to hold in cases where, in the absence of those transaction costs, it would fail to hold. When there are three parties, rather than hindering agreements, transaction costs can encourage Coasean bargaining.
Introduction
There are two versions of the Coase (1960) theorem that are commonly referred to in the literature. 1 The efficiency version states that if transaction costs are sufficiently low, then the initial legal regime or assignment of property rights will not hinder the parties from reaching an agreement in which all possible gains from trade have been exhausted. The invariance version states that if transaction costs are sufficiently low, then bargaining will always lead to the same level of the activity which generates the externality, irrespective of the initial legal regime or assignment of property rights.
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In an important and insightful paper, Aivazian and Callen (1981) showed that when there are three parties, both versions of the Coase Theorem can fail to hold even when transaction costs are low. This can happen because of the empty core problem, where an agreement between all three parties is unstable. It is possible that agreements between two parties which exclude the third are so profitable that the opportunity cost of those two parties entering an agreement with the third party may exceed the benefits. Hence any agreement between all three parties will be susceptible to coalitions of two players breaking away, and both versions of the Coase Theorem can fail to hold. 3 More recently, Aivazian and Callen (2003) extend these arguments, and argue that "if the core is empty in the absence of coalition formation costs, then it is necessarily empty with such costs."
How likely is the kind of instability identified by Aivazian and Callen, and how robust is their conclusion that the introduction of transaction costs will not improve matters? This paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, we develop a method for deriving all possible examples in which the Coase Theorem fails or holds when there are three parties. Second, we use this method to demonstrate that instability is relatively unlikely, and so the Coase Theorem will hold most of the time. Finally, we demonstrate that, in contrast to Aivazian and Callen (2003) , the 1 See Parisi (2008) for a recent summary of the literature on the Coase Theorem.
2 Cooter and Ulen (2012) , Robson and Skaperdas (2008) and Robson (2012) distinguish between these two versions.
3 introduction of transaction costs can cause an empty core to become non-empty. In other words, when transaction costs are introduced, the Coase Theorem can hold in cases where, in the absence of those transaction costs, it would fail to hold. Rather than hindering agreements, the existence of transaction costs can encourage Coasean bargaining.
The Basic Setup

The Aivazian-Callen (1981) Example
To illustrate the main issues, consider the following example, which is well known.
There are two factories, 1 and 2 , and a group of residents, R. Both factories emit pollution and this reduces the wellbeing of the residents. In the absence of production by the firms, the residents are assumed to enjoy utility of 40. If both firms produce, the residents' utility falls to 24. Therefore, production by both factories imposes a negative external cost of 16 (=40-24) on the residents. Suppose factory 1 imposes a negative external cost of 9 on the residents, whilst factory 2 imposes a negative external cost of 4. The marginal external cost to the residents is therefore not constant. Finally, assume that if the factories produce alone, they can earn profits of 3 and 8 respectively. If they merge and produce together, then they can jointly earn profits of 15. This reflects an assumption of economies of scale in production.
Note that in this example there is actually more than one class of externality at work.
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The first two externalities are negative, and are caused by the factories reducing the residents' wellbeing. The second externality is a positive externality -both factories producing together increases their joint profits. We shall see, however, that the mere existence of this positive externality is not sufficient to make the Coase Theorem fail -it is the size of the positive externality that matters.
The efficient outcome in this example is for both factories not to produce. 
Aivazian and Callen show that the core of this game is empty, and so there is no efficient agreement between the parties which is stable against threats by groups of two players to reach an agreement on their own. Now suppose that the factories must first obtain the residents' permission to produce. 
There is no payment that the factories could make to persuade the residents to let them produce. The core is non-empty and has a very simple structure: it is simply the point 12 0, 0, 40
Note, however, that the outcome is not the same as that under the no liability rule. Hence both versions of the Coase Theorem fail to hold in this example.
Modifying the Example
Only a slight modification of the previous example is needed to show how the previous result changes. Consider the same example, but now suppose that if the factories merge, they can realise joint profits of 12 rather than 15. This seems like a trivial modification -after all, our previous example featured economies of scale, this example simply makes those synergies slightly smaller. However, modifying the example in this way reduces the opportunity cost of firms 1 and 2 entering into agreement with the residents. This reduction in opportunity cost means that the firms require less compensation for entering such an agreement, which in turn means that the residents' net benefit will be higher than in the previous case.
This slight change now renders efficient agreement stable. The characteristic function is now: 
It is straightforward to show the core of this game is non-empty. For example, any set of agreements which satisfies:
where 01   , is feasible and will be stable against deviations by any deviation by a single party, as well as any deviation by a subcoalition of two parties. Hence the core is non-empty, and both versions of the Coase Theorem will hold.
Deriving All Three Player Examples
How ubiquitous is the example derived by Aivazian and Callen? To understand when the Coase Theorem will hold and when it will not when there are three parties, we consider the following asymmetric three player majority game. 5 In this game there are again three players, 1, 2 and R . When all players all act together, they can obtain a payoff of $1. If any two of them acting together can obtain a payoff smaller than 1, with different two player coalitions possibly obtaining different amounts. The characteristic function of this cooperative game is:
. Suppose that the payments 12 ,, R x x x are in the core of this game. Then these payments must be non-negative, and we must have ,,
. But if this second set of inequalities holds, they must also hold if we sum them together, so we must have: Moreover, the resulting cooperative game is cohesive.
Proof:
To prove the result, we use the 0-1 normalisation and the previous Lemma. []
The equivalence between the Aivazian-Callen example and the asymmetric majority game is not just a theoretical curiosum. It allows us to construct examples and counterexamples. More importantly, it allows us to investigate how frequently we should expect to see the Coase Theorem failing because of the problems of instability associated with the empty core, as well as the effects of transaction costs. These two issues are addressed in the remainder of the paper.
How Likely is it that the Coase Theorem Will Fail to Hold?
As discussed above, the equivalence between the three player bargaining game and the asymmetric majority game allows us to make precise statements about how likely it is that the core will be empty and the Coase Theorem will fail to hold. Since the two classes of games are equivalent, the failure of the Coase Theorem will hold with the same frequency that the core of the corresponding asymmetric majority game is non-empty, which requires   
The interpretation of this result is straightforward: whilst it is always possible to construct combinations of payoffs such as those obtained by Aivazian and Callen (1981) which result in an empty core, with three players these combinations are relatively unlikely to occur. In three player games, the failure of the Coase Theorem due to coalitional instability and the emptiness of the core is the exception rather than the rule.
Transaction Costs
One of the most important insights of Coase's (1960) analysis is that if transaction costs are sufficiently large, then the legal rule or structure of initial property rights matters for efficiency. Hence, there will exist efficiency enhancing and efficiency maximizing rules.
Avazian and Callen (2003) argue, using a special functional form for coalition formation costs, that "if the core is empty in the absence of coalition formation costs, then it is necessarily empty with such costs." Specifically, they assume that transaction costs take the following functional form:
where 1 k  .
These transaction costs are very specific. Is the result true in general? Proposition 1 can be used to show that it is not. 
On the other hand, we do not want N C to be so small that they are exceeded by the transaction costs of two-player coalitions. Hence we will also require:
  
where the last inequality follows from the choice of that N C , which satisfied   , the core of which is non-empty. ■ Hence, as long as the transaction costs associated with reaching an agreement between two parties are sufficiently high (relative to the transaction costs associated with agreement making between three parties), it is possible that the introduction of transaction costs will reduce the opportunity costs of the grand coalition reaching an efficient agreement, and a game which has an empty core will become a game with a non-empty core.
It is straightforward to apply this result to the Aivazian and Callen (1981) 
Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated the equivalence between the three party bargaining game studied by Aivazian and Callen (1981) and an asymmetric majority game to derive a number of results. We showed that when there are no transaction costs, the instability identified by Aivazian and Callen will occur relatively infrequently. Indeed, if all payoff combinations are equally likely, then Coasean bargaining is five times more likely than not. In the those cases where instability could arise due to the emptiness
